In the Introduction to his Treatise of Human Nature, the young David Hume makes a rather remarkable claim. He informs readers that what they are about to read is "a compleat system of the sciences, " which will provide the sciences with an entirely new foundation, and place them on a solid footing for the first time. As he writes:
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Fourteen months after publishing these lines, Hume returns to this theme in an anonymously published abstract of the Treatise, in which he again writes that "This treatise . . . of human nature seems intended for a system of the sciences. " And he adds (in the third person): " [W] ere his philosophy receiv' d, we must alter from the foundation the greatest part of the sciences. " 2 That Hume goes to the trouble of repeating these extraordinary claims more than a year after the publication of the Treatise suggests that the ambitions to which he gives voice in the Introduction were no passing whim. Hume really did take the Treatise to be "a compleat system of the sciences, " and he really did believe the existing sciences 1 139 Newtonian Explanatory Reduction and Hume's System would have to be more or less reconstructed in its wake. But most of Hume's readers, in his own time and in ours, have declined to give these claims much weight. Even Norman Kemp Smith, whose scholarship contributed so much to the present high regard for Hume as a philosopher, considered the Treatise too haphazard and eclectic a work to be anything like a "system of the sciences. "
3 And the same may be said of other interpreters of Hume who have followed his lead. 4 My purpose here will be to present a new interpretation of Hume's aims in his Treatise based on the supposition that the ambitions described in the Introduction were meant to be read literally, and that this work was indeed intended to present a new system of the sciences. But I argue that to understand what Hume was after, we have to consider these ambitions in light of the methods and achievements of the Newtonian philosophy.
My argument will be in three parts: (i) First, I examine Hume's claim to have proposed "a compleat system of the sciences" in light of Descartes' very similar claims.
5
Descartes' system consists of conclusions deduced from first principles thought to be self-evident. 6 Hume, however, argues that knowledge is derived principally from 3 Kemp Smith ([1941] 2005) argues that Hume is excessively distrustful of parsimony and simplicity, "accept [ing] with an all too easy conscience the loose ends of doctrine in which his 'experimental' method was repeatedly landing him. " On this view, Hume invokes a morasse of different fundamental principles, with new ones being introduced on an ad hoc basis whenever his argument runs into trouble. As Kemp Smith writes: "How numerous and motley a collection of ultimates he would recommend to our acceptance! All impressions of sensation, and as regards impressions of reflexion, the various appetites and passions moral and aesthetic, approvals and disapprovals, custom as an agency capable of generating a quite new feeling, the propensity of the mind to spread itself over external objects, these-with sympathy in the moral sphere and belief in the theoretical sphere standing ready to yield support to one and all of them-are the sorts of factors which Hume was prepared to regard as ultimate, and to which he freely resorted in circumventing the obstacles that beset his path. " Kemp Smith does acknowledge Hume's commitment to parsimony in principle, but maintains that his "practice" is not in keeping with this commitment (p. 59). 4 See, for example, of John Passmore's appraisal of Hume as "a philosophical puppy-dog, picking up and worrying one problem after another, always leaving his teeth-marks in it, but casting it aside when it threatened to become wearisome" (Passmore 1968, pp. 87-88) . Passmore does try to figure out what Hume means by a "system of the sciences. " But he doesn't get very far, and ends up concluding that Hume's foundational enterprise isn't meant to be taken seriously: " [Hume] is deliberately arousing expectations, in order the more effectively to show that they cannot be fulfilled" (Ibid., p. 42) . 5 Readings of Hume that have tried to make sense of Hume's foundationalist aspirations have been relatively rare. Focused treatments are found in Passmore (1968) , Boehm (2008, and forthcoming) , and Schliesser (2009, pp. 6-14) . 6 Descartes does not use the term "deduction" in the formal, Scholastic-Aristotelian sense. His is a much looser use of the term, roughly equivalent to what we mean by an "inference" (Normore 1993, pp. 437-454; Owen 1999, pp. 12-29) . Much of early modern thought follows Descartes on this point, including Newton. Compare Samuel Johnson's dictionary, which has as its first entry 1 141 Newtonian Explanatory Reduction and Hume's System some measure dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and cou' d explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasoning.
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It is this "dependence" of the other sciences on the science of human nature, and especially of the human mind, that underwrites Hume's claim, quoted above, that there is "no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz' d in the science of man. "
Similarly, when Hume writes that his system will be built on "a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which [the sciences] can stand with any security"; and when he writes, a little later, that " [T] he science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences"-he is suggesting an architectural metaphor in which the science of human nature serves as the foundation for a structure that is made up of the other sciences. 11 Just as the higher reaches of the building stand secure only if they are built atop firm foundations, so too in the sciences: the other sciences are to be seen as being built up on top of the science of human nature, which alone can provide the "solid foundation" that is "the only one upon which they can stand with any security. "
This manner of speaking about the sciences is not original to Hume, and it seems clear that when he speaks of his philosophy as a "system of the sciences" based on foundations that are "secure" and "solid, " he is inviting comparison with other, earlier systems. Indeed, he opens the Treatise with a reference to these other "systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and [have] carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning, " and explicitly derides them for the "weakness" of their "foundations. "
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What systems did Hume have in mind? One of the principal ones must have been Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, which purports to "deduce" physics and the other sciences from metaphysics. Indeed, Descartes' writings are riddled with well-known allusions to the "weakness" or "solidity" of the "foundations" upon which the edifice 1 142 Newton and "Empiricist" Philosophers of the sciences supposedly stands. 13 In light of this striking similarity between Hume's declared aims and those of Descartes, it is worth asking what it is that makes Descartes' philosophy a system of the sciences.
Three aspects of Descartes' system immediately stand out. First, there is Descartes' understanding, inherited from Scholastic philosophy, of the various sciences being hierarchically ordered like a tree, with metaphysics as its base and the other sciences branching above it. 14 As Descartes writes:
The first part of philosophy is metaphysics, which contains the principles of knowledge, including the explanation of the principal attributes of God . . . . The second part is physics, where, after discovering the true principles of material things, we examine the general composition of the entire universe, and then, in particular, the nature of this earth and all the bodies that are commonly found upon it. . . . Next, we need to examine individually the nature of plants, of animals, and, above all, of man. . . . Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences. . . .
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In addition, this hierarchical ordering can be seen as consisting of two parts: the "foundations, " which are a set of first principles "so evident that the human mind cannot doubt their truth"; and the rest of human knowledge, which is held in place in the hierarchy of knowledge by chains of deductions that are "very manifest. " As Descartes explains:
[For] knowledge to be perfect it must be deduced from first causes . . . or principles. These principles must satisfy two conditions [:] [i] First, they must be so clear and so evident that the human mind cannot on them, we must try to ensure that everything in the entire chain of deductions which we draw is very manifest.
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For Descartes, a system of the sciences was thus a hierarchical ordering of the sciences, in which a set of indubitable first principles serves as the "foundation, " and the other sciences are shown to follow from these by means of chains of deductions. 18 Descartes' actual method of discovery was in fact more complicated than this, relying on a procedure for discovering these first principles, as well as on observation and experiment to fill out the tree of knowledge. 19 Nevertheless, the belief that knowledge gleaned through these efforts would be easily assimilated into a single system of the sciences held together by necessary deductions was an unmistakable feature of the Cartesian philosophy.
In what sense can Hume see his own philosophy as resembling a system of the , pp. 183-184, 188-189. 19 Descartes' presentation of his system of the sciences in the Principles strongly resembles the Scholastic systems with which it was competing, but his deductive structure obscures a more complicated method of discovery that is used to attain the knowledge ordered by this structure. Descartes was apparently committed to a method of discovery that consisted of (i) the reduction of all known effects to irreducible "simple natures" known by intuition; and (ii) deduction ("inference of something as following necessarily") from these intuitions. It was this method that was used to construct the more general parts of Descartes' deductive system of the sciences. The more specialized parts of the system, on the other hand, relied on observations and experiments, whose results were then supposed to fit into the deductive system for presentation as part of an integrated whole. See, especially, Descartes (1985 Descartes ( [1628 , pp. 14-15); Descartes (1637, pp. 143-144) . For discussion see Raftopoulos (2003) ; Gaukroger (2005); Garber (1993); Marion (1992) . 20 David Hume ([1748 , Hume (1739, pp. 180-183 The only thing missing from Boehm's reconstruction of the hierarchical structure of the Hume's system of the sciences, then, is the common foundation for Books I and II. Such a foundation is needed, for otherwise there would not be one system of the sciences, but two. This common foundation, as Passmore correctly suggests, is the science of human psychology, which provides Hume's equivalent of metaphysical first principles, or "true metaphysics. " Once psychology takes its place as the most fundamental level in the hierarchy, Hume's system of the sciences is seen to have the form of a tree, as depicted in Figure 6 .1. 
EXPLANATORY REDUCTION IN BOYLE AND NEWTON
As it turns out, one does not have to be a builder of deductive systems from a priori premises to see the sciences as being related to one another in a hierarchical structure. The idea that the sciences form such a structure has survived the emergence of modern experimental science and has, in fact, flourished, although with some modifications. First, in contemporary accounts of the sciences as a hierarchy, physics is commonly taken to be foundational science, with all other sciences constructed on top of it. 32 Second, instead of being held together by a series of deductions from first principles as in Descartes' science, the natural sciences are today usually said to proceed to more fundamental levels of explanation by means of one or another kind of reduction of the more specialized sciences to the simpler and more general terms provided by the more basic sciences. 33 In the present section, I will look at 1 148 Newton and "Empiricist" Philosophers the emergence of explanatory reduction as a strategy for establishing an empirically derived system of the sciences in the thought of Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton. In the next section, I will turn to the impact of this emerging understanding of the sciences on Hume's Treatise of Human Nature.
The term reduction (in Latin, reductio; or analysis in Greek) or resolution has a long and complex history in philosophy and mathematics, grounded in the suggestion that the key to epistemic advancement is the reduction of complex things to a scheme of simpler ones. Even Descartes, despite his consistent emphasis on the deductive structure of the sciences, argues in his Rules for Direction of the Mind that scientific discovery must begin with a reductive step that precedes the deductive one. As he writes, we first "reduce complicated and obscure propositions step by step to simpler ones, " until we reach certain "pure and simple natures" that are known to the intellect as being irreducible. It is from these "most simple and primary things"-the awareness that one is a thinking being is a famous example-that all other things can be deduced. 34 Descartes' Rules, however, remained incomplete and unpublished during his lifetime, and how, precisely, he intended for us to distinguish these "most simple and primary things" from everything else in our experience remains obscure. to a small number of fundamental terms drawn from his "corpuscularian" physicsthese terms being matter and motion, together with certain basic properties of matter such as shape and size. 37 In comparing the two proposed schemes of fundamental terms, Boyle presents the "chief advantages" of his hypothesis over its competitors as follows:
If the principles proposed be corporeal things, they will then be fairly reducible or reconcilable to the Mechanical principles, these being so general and pregnant that among things corporeal there is nothing real . . . that may not be derived from, or brought to a subordination to, such comprehensive principles. And when the chemists shall show that mixed bodies owe their qualities to the predominancy of this or that of their three grand ingredients, the Corpuscularians will show that the very qualities of this or that ingredient flow from its peculiar texture and the mechanical affections of the corpuscles it is made up of. . . .
[B] ecause of the great universality and simplicity of [our principles], the new ones proposed must be less general than they, and therefore capable of being subordinated or reduced to ours. "
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In this passage, Boyle is not arguing for the falsity of Paracelsian chemistry. Rather, his interest is to show that whatever truth there may be in the chemists' claim that "mixed bodies owe their qualities to . . . their three grand ingredients, " it will still be possible to "reduce" these ingredients to the more "general" and "comprehensive" principles derived from his physics. For Boyle, Boyle ([1674 Boyle ([ ] 1991 . Empasis removed from the word Corpuscularian. In this essay, Boyle refers to a Dialogue about a Good Hypothesis, which was apparently never written. See ibid., p. 138. Manuscript notes, apparently for this dialogue, state that "the qualities and conditions of an excellent hypothesis" include that it be "the simplest of all the good ones we are able to frame"; that it be the best at explaining known phenomena; and that it enable the prediction of new phenomena, especially under conditions of experiments devised to test it. Boyle ([undated] 1991, p. 119) . 39 The distinction between chemistry and physics is admittedly anachronistic in this context. But I do think these terms help clarify where Boyle's hierarchy among empirical sciences was leading. constitutes the "excellency" of a scientific hypothesis-which focuses on two qualities of a scientific theory: the simplicity of its terms, and their generality. As is evident from his discussion of fireworks quoted above, Boyle is using the term simple in a very straightforward sense. Any compound that can be reduced "by a row of decompositions" to its physical "ingredients" is thereby reduced to terms that are "more simple and primary. " In this sense, the simplest terms are just those that cannot be reduced any further because they are not further divisible into components of different kinds.
41
By comprehensiveness or generality, on the other hand, Boyle refers to the range of the phenomena that can be reduced or subordinated to the scheme of terms and laws 40 Ibid., 147.
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151 Newtonian Explanatory Reduction and Hume's System in question. A more excellent hypothesis will be one that can embrace a broader range of phenomena-and indeed, his argument against the chemists is that their fundamental terms "can reach but to a small part of the phenomena of nature, " and that a much broader range of phenomena must be "taken in" if the terms in question are to be seen as foundational. 42 That is, Boyle sees a reduction to chemical terms as being based only on "narrow principles" (or "confined hypotheses") 43 reaching "but to a small part of the phenomena of nature, " and "leav[ing] the greatest part of the phenomena of the universe unexplicated. " And these chemical elements will in any case be found to be "reducible or reconcilable" to a more "general and pregnant" scheme of terms, which are the fundamental principles of the mechanical philosophy: "These principles . . . being so simple, clear and comprehensive, are applicable to all the real phenomena of nature . . . . "
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By focusing scientific discussion on the comparative simplicity and generality of competing schemes of explanatory terms, Boyle succeeds in articulating the aim of natural philosophy in terms of explanatory reduction. He thereby provides empirical science with a way of understanding the "system of the sciences" to be hierarchical. For
Boyle, there is one fundamental science that can be seen as providing the foundations for the hierarchy of the sciences-the science we today call physics-and the other sciences will be held in their places in the hierarchy of the sciences by means of a reduction of their schemes of simplest causes to that provided by physics.
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Let us compare this achievement with Descartes' attempts at understanding what holds the system of the sciences together. For Descartes, the effort at reducing complex things to simplest natures is an effort at discovering things that are implanted in the human mind by God, and that, once found, cannot be mistaken. From these, the known phenomena can be deduced, and once they have been so deduced, one need 42 "[I] f the chemists or others that would deduce a complete natural philosophy from salt, sulphur and mercury, or any other set number of ingredients of things, would well consider what they undertake, they might easily discover that the material parts of bodies, as such, can reach but to a small part of the phenomena of nature, [so long as] these ingredients are considered but as quiescent things. . . . [S] o that the chemists . . . must (as indeed they are wont to do) leave the greatest part of the phenomena of the universe unexplicated by the help of the ingredients . . . of bodies, without taking in the mechanical and more comprehensive affectations of matter, especially local motion" (Ibid., . 43 Ibid., p. 149. 44 Ibid., p. 153. 45 On Boyle's willingness to replace the Scholastic system with an empirical "system, " see Anstey (2000, pp. 4-6) . Boyle believed that empirical systems are desirable, but that they must be regarded as "temporary": "I would have such kind of superstructures looked upon only as temporary ones; which though they be preferred before any others, as being the least imperfect, or, if you please, the best in their kind that we yet have, yet are not entirely acquiesced in, as absolutely perfect, regulated by a few fundamental laws, and uses these to explain projectile motion, the orbiting of the planets and their moons, the trajectories of comets, the shape of the earth, and the tides. This breathtaking capacity to explain the movements of objects on earth, the movements of the heavens, and the effects of the heavenly bodies on movements on earth-all in terms of a few fundamental concepts-did indeed seem to provide a solid foundation, almost entirely new, for the sciences. 47 And in a sense, this achievement rests on an understanding of the aim of science as explanatory reduction that had been advanced by Boyle.
Still, it is hard to say that Boyle's account of explanatory reduction serves as a description of what takes place in Newton's Principia. In his Grounds and Excellency of the Mechanical Hypothesis, Boyle's discussion of explanatory reduction in the sciences emphasizes examples in which a physical compound is reduced to another by breaking 46 Thus in the Principles, Descartes says that philosophy must begin when we "attend in an orderly way to the notions that we have within us, and we must judge to be true all and only those whose truth we clearly and distinctly recognize. . . . " (Descartes 1644, p. 221) . This judgment he considers impossible of error, in that "we will never mistake the false for the true provided we give our assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive" (Ibid., p. 207) . Regarding the reliability of the deductions, Descartes writes that "if it turns out that the results of such deductions agree with all natural phenomena, we would seem to be doing God an injustice if we suspected that the causal explanations discovered in this way were false" (Ibid., p. 255 And this suggests the need for a more general articulation of explanatory reduction than
Boyle is able to provide.
Newton himself offers his most cogent description of the explanatory reduction 49 at the heart of the Principia in his famous Query 31, a postscript to his Opticks first published in 1717. 50 There Newton describes the method of explanatory reduction as follows:
As in mathematics, so in natural philosophy, the investigation of difficult things by the method of analysis, ought ever to precede the method of composition 48 Boyle (1991 Boyle ( [1764 , p. 144). 49 Newton uses the term reduction as well, and when it appears, it is used in the manner of Boyle or Hume. For example, in a letter to Cotes, Newton writes: "Experimental philosophy reduces phenomena to general rules and looks upon the rules to be general when they hold generally in phenomena" (Newton 2004, p. 121, emphasis added Let's look more closely at Newton's description of analysis and synthesis. The "way of analysis, " Newton tells us, "may proceed from compounds to ingredients, and from motions to the forces producing them. " Thus Newtonian analysis subsumes the decomposition of compounds into their ingredients that figures prominently in Boyle's discussion. But Newton understands the ingredients that make up chemical compounds as being analogous to the forces that together make up the visible motions of objects.
Both the ingredients that together make up chemical compounds and the forces that make up movements, Newton says, are to be considered as causes: thus gunpowder is to be seen as an effect, of which niter, charcoal, and sulpher are the causes; and in the same way, the orbital motion of a planet is to be seen as the effect, of which the
Compare this text to the similar programmatic statement in the preface to Newton ([1726] 1999, p. 382). 52 Newton's use of analysis and synthesis is part of a broad seventeenth-century debate over the meaning of these terms spurred by the publication in 1588 of a Latin translation of Pappus' Collection, Book VII. For discussion, see Guicciardini (2009, pp. 31-38) ; Behboud (1994) . For the roots of these concepts in Plato and Aristotle, see Cornford (1932) ; Goodman (2001, pp. 191-198) . 53 "Although they [i.e., Newton and his followers] too hold that the causes of all things are to be derived from the simplest possible principles, they assume nothing as a principle that has not yet been thoroughly proved from phenomena. . . . Therefore, they proceed by a twofold method, analytic and synthetic. From certain selected phenomena they deduce by analysis the forces of nature and the simpler laws of those forces, from which they then give the constitution of the rest of the phenomena by synthesis" (Cotes 1713, p. 386) . Thus Cotes, too, argues that the "causes of all things" can be known only by reaching "the simplest possible principles. " He says that inertial movement of the planet and the centripetal force pulling it toward the sun are to be seen as the causes. Of course orbital motion is not a compound object in the same sense that gunpowder is. Gunpowder is actually created by mixing ingredients together, whereas the orbit of the moon around the earth seems to be a single thing until the invention of the concepts of rectilinear inertial motion and the centripetal pull of the earth make it possible to conceive of it, for the first time, as a compound.
Yet Newton insists on this parallel: in all sciences, there is to be, at the outset, a reduction "from effects to their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones, till the argument end in the most general"-even where these causes appear at first to be entirely theoretical.
The later synthetic movement in Newton's method is quite different. Here, Newton says that we begin by "assuming the causes discover' d, and establish' d as principles, "
and then proceed to "explaining the phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the explanations. " Newton says that most of the Principia is synthetic. 54 And he does in fact begin the Principia with a set of definitions and axioms (the three "laws of motion") as had been accepted in synthetic geometric treaties since Euclid. These provide the simplest and most general terms that are assumed throughout the treatise, and that are ultimately used to explain the phenomena.
This having been said, the Principia does not proceed like any other treatise in geometry, and how exactly if fulfills its synthetic mission is not so straightforward.
Book I of the Principia does proceed from Newton's axioms and those of geometry to derive general principles governing the motion of bodies subject to centripetal forces under different conditions. But as Newton explains, these principles are strictly "mathematical"-meaning that they are ideal depictions of hypothetical conditions, and are not necessarily those that apply to the known phenomena gathered from experience.
For example, Newton derives the principles of orbital motion not only for our world, in which centripetal forces fall off in proportion to the square of the radius, but also for cases in which centripetal forces fall off in proportion to the cube of the radius, or for any other power. Determining which forces in fact apply to our world is left to Book III, which could easily be described as beginning once more with the method of analysis before proceeding to synthesis: in Book III, Newton begins with real-world Newton's method of analysis is used to "deduce" (using this term in its loose seventeenth-century sense) the "forces of nature and the simpler laws of these forces" from "certain selected phenomena. " And he too argues that once these are established, it is possible to move to "the rest of the phenomena by synthesis. " 54 For example, in an unpublished draft preface to the Principia, Newton writes that "in the following treatise I have demonstrated by synthesis the propositions found by analysis. " Quoted in Cohen (1999, p. 50) .
1 156 Newton and "Empiricist" Philosophers phenomena such as astronomical tables and measurements of terrestrial gravity made with a pendulum, and from these, in light of the principles derived in Book I, establishes the actual centripetal forces acting on orbiting bodies and the actual law of gravitation (Propositions 1-7). 55 Having established the law of gravity as a general cause, Newton then proceeds synthetically, assuming this law as a given, and from there using it to explain other phenomena such as the trajectories of comets, the shape of the earth, and the rising and falling of seas (Propositions 8-42).
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For present purposes, we do not have to delve further into the synthetic method of the Principia. But a better view of Newton's method of analysis would be helpful.
We know that this method of analysis is rooted in gathering phenomena by means of experiment and observation because Newton tells us so. But as to the manner by means of which one proceeds "from effects to their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones, " or how one gets from experiments and observations to "general conclusions, " Newton's pronouncements are remarkably terse. In the passage quoted above from the Opticks, Newton says simply that one proceeds from effects to causes "by induction, " and strives to make this induction "stronger" by rendering it as "general" as possible:
[A] lthough the arguing from experiments and observations by induction be no demonstration of general conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the nature of things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the induction is more general. "
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In other passages, Newton says that in his natural philosophy "propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made general by induction"; or that "the main business" of natural philosophy is to "argue from phenomena" and "to deduce causes from effects. " Rule 2. Therefore, the causes assigned to natural effects of the same kind must be, so far as possible, the same. 59 Rule 4 has been read as reflecting a revolution in the way theoretical principles can be used to force the phenomena to point to ever more precise explanations of just how they have been produced, thereby initiating a "research program" generating ever-improving measurements intended to support or disconfirm Newton's laws. See Smith (2001 Smith ( , 2002 Harper (1997) . This seems to suggest that Rule 4 should be seen as being related in some way to the method of synthesis Newton describes in Query 31 of the Opticks. But a more careful comparison of the two texts suggests that Rules 1-4 all correspond to aspects of Newton's method of analysis as described in Query 31. 60 See Ducheyne (2005) , Harper (2002b, 182-185) .
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Of these, Newton's first two examples-that the cause of respiration should be the same in men and animals, and that the cause of falling stones should be the same in Europe and America-are apparently selected so as to appear plausible to just about anyone. But his third and fourth examples are designed to be more difficult. Newton here asks his readers to understand that when he speaks in Rule 2 of uniting "effects of the same kind, "
he has in mind a "sameness" that extends so far as seeking a single cause behind the production of light in a kitchen fire and in the sun; or that will treat the cause of reflection in terrestrial objects as being the same as that which makes the planets visible in the night sky. These examples turn Rule 2 into something more radical than it seems at first, because they suggest that the heart of successful explanatory reduction consists in bringing together under a single cause effects that are as widely scattered as the phenomenal world permits, and that may not at first glance (or to most observers) appear to be "of the same kind" at all. Rule 3 then enlarges these results even further, suggesting that a cause established by Rule 2 can, by means of a form of enumerative induction, be seen as operative in microscopic bodies too small to be detected and in celestial bodies outside of the range of our instruments.
In the General Scholium at the end of the Second Edition, Newton explicitly names those points in the Principia that "have been found by this method, " telling us precisely what it is that he believes he has discovered by deducing propositions from the phenomena and making them general by induction. As he writes:
In this experimental philosophy, propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made general by induction.
[i] The impenetrability, mobility, and impetus of bodies, and [ii] the laws of motion and [iii] the law of gravity have been found by this method.
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That these three aspects of the Principia are the result of the successful application of Newton's Rules 1-3 is not equally evident in each case. The point is clearest with respect to (iii) the universal law of gravitation, which is derived in Book III, Propositions 1-7, amid explicit references to Newton's Rules. Of these, perhaps most dramatic is his declaration in Propostion 4 of the identity between terrestrial gravity and the force holding the moon in its orbit, which is repeated in the Scholium immediately thereafter:
Therefore, since both forces-namely those of heavy bodies [on earth] and those of the moons-are directed toward the center of the earth and are similar to each other and equal, they will (by Rules 1 and 2) have the same cause. This is followed, in Proposition 7, by Newton's conclusion that "[g] ravity exists in all bodies universally, " 64 as required by the application of Rule 3. Here the application of Newton's Rules, as well as their identity with his other descriptions of his method, is plain.
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Nor is it very difficult to see Newton's Rules at work in his establishment of (ii) the laws of motion that serve as the axioms at the beginning of the Principia. Least straightforward is Newton's claim that the very same method is used to derive (i) essential properties of matter. This derivation takes place in his gloss on Rule 3, a famously obscure text that asserts, among other things, that "nature is always simple and ever consonant with herself, " so that we are permitted to conclude that "because extension is found in all sensible bodies, it is [to be] ascribed to all bodies universally. "
The supposition that all bodies are extended is here applied to bodies at the ends of the 64 Ibid., p. 810.
1 160 Newton and "Empiricist" Philosophers universe, no less than to the microscopic parts of bodies beyond the reach of experiments. And the same is said for the "hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia" of all bodies universally. Newton sees these as general causes known to be present universally, which are to be regarded as "the foundation of all natural philosophy. " 69 Newton draws a direct parallel between his derivation of these essential properties of matter by way of Rules 2 and 3, and his establishment of the laws of motion and the law of gravitation by means of these same Rules. This means that Newton believes the source of scientific knowledge of essential properties of matter such as extension, hardness, and the inertial mass of bodies derives from the discovery of sameness in widely disparate objects as well.
What all this means is that Newton's Rule 2 is not just an elaboration of Boyle's thesis that the excellence of an explanatory reduction relates to the greater generality of the terms to which the phenomena are reduced. Nor is it a mere repetition of Newton's own Rule 1, which, like Ockham's razor, suggests that extraneous causes be dispensed with. Rather, when Newton writes in Rule 2 that the causes assigned to natural effects must be so far as possible the same, what he is in fact saying is that the reduction of the phenomena to ever more general causes that is the heart of his method involves a struggle to discover whether sameness is possible among phe- 
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The Newtonian version of inference from phenomena to causes, then, focuses on the discovery of sameness among disparate effects as the engine driving the movement "from effects to their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones, till the argument end in the most general"-to an extent that was unprecedented before Newton and has been uncommon since. This distinct form of explanatory reduction 1 161 Newtonian Explanatory Reduction and Hume's System must therefore be regarded as a unique Newtonian contribution to science. It was, however, adopted and closely followed by Hume as the cement that holds together his system of the sciences.
EXPLANATORY REDUCTION AND HUME'S SYSTEM OF THE SCIENCES
In the Introduction to his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume describes what he takes to be the appropriate method for the study of human nature. These passages are well known, and Hume is widely noted for arguing that the science of man must be a form of "experimental philosophy, " which is to be founded on "experience and observation" just as natural philosophy had been. As he writes:
[T] he essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and faculties otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations.
1 162 Newton and "Empiricist" Philosophers of aims and methods is already evident in the Introduction to the Treatise, where Hume writes:
[W] e must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes. . . .
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Like Newton, Hume explains that the aim is "tracing up our experiments" until one arrives at "the utmost, " namely, those "simplest and fewest causes, " or "principles as universal as possible, " by means of which one can then go about "explaining all effects. "
In the Abstract to the Treatise, Hume repeats this description, directly comparing his method to that which has been so successful in natural philosophy:
['T]is at least worth while to try if the science of man will not admit of the same accuracy which several parts of natural philosophy are found susceptible of. . . .
If, in examining several phenomena, we find that they resolve themselves into one common principle, and can trace this principle into another, we shall at last arrive at those few simple principles on which all the rest depend.
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Note that in this passage, Hume makes direct reference to a principle like Newton's Rule 2, arguing that his aim is to find that "several phenomena . . . resolve themselves into one common principle. . . . " The hierarchical ordering of causes that is familiar from Newton also appears here in Hume's hope that the common principle to which the several phenomena are reduced, can then be traced into another principle, and so forth until "we shall at last arrive at those few simple principles on which all the rest depend. "
75 The passage continues: "[I] t is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at [once] to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical" (Hume 1739, pp. xvii) . Compare: "Here, therefore, moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural, with regard to astronomy before the time of Copernicus. The antients, tho' sensible of that maxim, that nature does nothing in vain, contriv' d such intricate systems of the heavens, as seem' d inconsistent with true philosophy, and gave place at last to something more simple and natural. To invent without scruple a new principle to every new phenomenon, instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our hypotheses with a variety of this kind; are certain proofs, that none of these principles is the just one, and that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods, to cover our ignorance of the truth" (Ibid., p. 282). As Capaldi points out, Hume compares himself here not to Newton, but to Copernicus (Capaldi 1967, p. 81) . 76 He continues: "And tho' we can never arrive at the ultimate principles, 'tis a satisfaction to go as far as our faculties will allow us" (Hume 1740, p. 646).
Almost a decade later, in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
Hume repeats much the same description, now calling this the aim, not only of science, but of "human reason" in general:
[T] he utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation.
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A similar discussion, which includes a reference to the hierarchical ordering of the causes derived from observation and experiment, appears in the Enquiry as well:
It is probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another;
which, again, may be resolved into one more general and universal: And how far these researches may possibly be carried, it will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. That this is essentially a recapitulation of Newton's method is, I think, difficult to deny. But Hume's description of this method is considerably more straightforward, dispensing with the cumbersome categories that make Newton's discussion of his science so confusing. Gone are the convoluted attempts to describe the Newtonian method in 1 164 Newton and "Empiricist" Philosophers terms of deduction and induction from phenomena-indeed, these terms disappear almost entirely from Hume's Treatise. 80 From these passages and many others like them, it is evident that Hume uses Boyle's terms reduction and resolution to refer to the kind of inference to the simplest and most general principles or causes, which he describes as being the entire aim of his scientific method;
and which Newton similarly describes as the aim of his own method.
Why the change in terminology? Hume does not say, and we are left to guess. My own feeling is that Hume's desire to avoid undesirable Aristotelian connotations led him to bypass "deduction" and "induction"-terms that Newton used and that have in subsequent centuries led to a great deal of confusion as to his intentions, even where these are relatively clear. As to analysis and synthesis, the meaning of these terms was not evident in Newton's day either. Newton uses them in the passages cited above in a manner that is perhaps not even consistent with his own mathematical usage, and is certainly quite dissimilar from the way in which these terms are used by Descartes or Leibniz. 92 Indeed, in Peirce's account 88 Hume (1748, p. 22, emphasis added) . 89 Hume (1739, p. 441, emphasis added) . 90 Ibid., p. 282, emphasis added. 91 Ibid., p. 441. 92 In the mathematics of the seventeenth century, the term "analysis" was frequently used to refer to algebraic equations (common analysis) and to infinite series and infinitesimals (the new analysis). Why the term analysis came to be used in this way, and what its relationship really was the meaning of the terms analysis and synthesis appears to have been reversed, with Peirce referring to deductive inference, which in Newton is the method of synthesis, as "analytic"; and to inference from phenomena to their causes, which in Newton is the method of analysis, as "synthetic. " 93 Hume seems to have seen both the language of deduction and induction and that of analysis and synthesis as confused and extraneous.
But the acceptance of Boyle's less technical terminology is not accompanied by a reversion to a less sophisticated understanding of the aims and methods of science. On the contrary, Hume embraces and refines Newton's highly abstracted use of methodological concepts such as "resolution, " "cause, " and "simplicity, " even as he clarifies the methodological picture by discarding the terms that had cluttered Newton's presentation of his method. In this sense, Hume's philosophy of science can be seen as improving upon Newton's, while maintaining an almost complete continuity with the central features that made it the most formidible in early modern science.
These conclusions permit us to recognize that Hume owes a much greater debt to Newtonian philosophy than is commonly supposed. In particular, Hume's Treatise of Human Nature is seen as adopting the aims and methods of Newtonian science, not merely with respect to experiment and observation, but especially with regard to the heart of the Principia's method. The purpose of Newtonian science is to achieve a reduction of the phenomena to a scheme of simplest and most general causes, and with them to explain the phenomena. And precisely this is the aim and purpose of Hume's Treatise as well.
We can now also answer a riddle that has emerged in the Scholars have thus recognized that Hume reduces certain phenomena to a scheme of basic psychological elements, and that he sees these reductions as a contribution to a broader scientific enterprise. But the centrality of this attempt to reduce the sciences to a small set of fundamental terms has been consistently underestimated: these facts have not been examined within the broader context of Hume's declared aim of establishing a "compleat system of the sciences, " his explicit statements concerning his own philosophical method, and his relationship to Newton's method. Once these factors are brought into view, we have a clear explanation as to why explanatory reduction is, in Loptson's phrase, "central and pervasive" in the Treatise: when Hume writes in the Introduction of the Treatise that his aim is to "render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, " he means that his aim is to explain all phenomena by reducing them to the simplest, fewest, and most universal principles or causes.
Explanatory reduction is central and pervasive in the Treatise because it is what the
Treatise is all about, just as it is what Newton's Principia is all about.
Moreover, it is these reductions that establish Hume's "system of the sciences" in its hierarchical ordering, since it is explanatory reduction that ties a given science to that which is below it in Hume's tree of the sciences. And it is these reductions, too, which provide the "foundation almost entirely new" upon which the system is built. This new foundation for the sciences is the scheme of simplest and fewest causes, drawn from human psychology, to which Hume's entire system of the sciences can ultimately be reduced.
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